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AIRPORT NOISE POLLUTION:
A Remedy for the Adjacent Landowner
Angus Bane Fulton
INTRODUCTION

For over 15 years, jet travel has been a welcomed fact of
life-except to those who are daily buffeted by the roar of aircraft
operating in close proximity to their homes and families. For these
people, the law has been slow in developing remedies, in part because the law has historically not recognized a specific property
right or interest which was injured by such intangibles as noise
originating from outside the landowner's boundaries. This comment
will analyze existing law in Montana, compare recent developments
in other jurisdictions, and show how, reasoning by analogy from
recognized and related property interests, the Montana Supreme
Court may reach an adequate remedy which is consistent with the
pattern and development of Montana law.
CONDEMNATION

By NUISANCE

Prior to 1946, the legal remedies for invasion of the use and
enjoyment of land rested on one of numerous theories: 1) the landowner owned all of the airspace "from the heavens to the depths
of the earth,"' 2) the landowner owned all of the airspace, subject
to a public easement for flight, 3) the landowner owned that amount
of airspace as established by statute, 4) the landowner owned airspace to the extent that he could effectively possess it, and 5) the
landowner owned all the airspace that he could actually occupy. 2
However, in 1946, the legal theory changed with the decision of
United States v. Causby,3 when the United States Supreme Court
established the "overflight requirement":
[Sluperadjacent airspace .

.

. is so close to the land that

continuous invasions of it affect the use of the surface of the land
itself. We think that the landowner, as an incident to his ownership, has a claim to it and that invasions of it are in the same
category as invasions of the surface. .

.

. the flight of airplanes,

which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropri1. Klien, "Cujus Est Solum Ejus Est... Quousque Tandem?," 26 J. Am L. & COMM.
237 (1959).
2. Anderson, Some Aspects of Airspace Trespass," 27 J. Am L. & COMM. 341 (1960).
See also Russell, "Recent Developments in Inverse Condemnation of Airspace," 39 J. Am L.
& COMM. 81 (1973).
3. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
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ation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon
it. .

..

In the early 1960's, a few state supreme courts chose to eliminate the overflight requirement set forth in United States v Causby.
In Martin v Port of Seattle,5 where the plaintiff sought compensation for aircraft noise originating outside the boundaries of his land,
the Washington supreme court permitted recovery. The court
stated, "We are unable to accept the premise that recovery for interference with the use of land should depend on anything as irrelevant
as whether the wing tip of an aircraft passes through some fraction
of an inch of the airspace directly above the plaintiff's land." 6 The
elimination of this overflight requirement means that aircraft noise,
which interferes with the use and enjoyment of the surface of land
and originates outside the boundaries of land, is compensable as a
taking or damaging under the eminent domain provision.
The cause of action used in Causby and Martin is a type of
inverse condemnation, which is a general cause of action "against a
governmental entity having the power of eminent domain to recover
the value of property which has been appropriated in fact but with
no formal exercise of the power." 7 An action seeking compensation
for aircraft noise is a peculiar combination of the law of nuisance
and property law. The action is more aptly decribed as condemnation by nuisance, which is an activity constituting a nuisance under
the application of tort law, by an entity having the power of eminent
domain, that is a taking or damaging of property for public use.'
In examining whether aircraft noise originating outside the
boundaries of land is compensable, a comparison of Montana law
with Washington law will be made, since both states' eminent domain provisions contain the language "taking or damaging."' The
analysis will be made by examining the definition of "property" in
the context of the eminent domain provision and then the definition
of "taking or damaging."
DEFINITION OF "PROPERTY"

A.

Use and Enjoyment of Land

As stated in Moris Cohen's article Property and Sovereignty,
"Anyone who frees himself from the crudest materialism readily
4. Id. at 264-65.
5. Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964).
6. Id. at 545.
7. Id. at 542 n.1.
8. Stoebuck, "Condemnation by Nuisance: The Airport Cases in Retrospect and
Prospect," 71 DICKINSON L. R. 207, 209 (1966).
9. WASH. CONST. art. 1, §16; MONT. CONST. art. f1, §29.
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recognizes that as a legal term property denotes not material things
but certain rights."' 0 The United States Supreme Court has also
adopted a similar definition of property. In United States v General
Motors Corp.," the Court noted that property is a group of rights
inhering in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, such as the
right to possess, use, and dispose of the physical thing.
Washington's recognition that certain rights or interests are
property appears in many cases. As early as 1901 in State ex rel
Smith v Superior Court of King County, the court recognized that
ownership of land as applied in the eminent domain provision en12
compasses the right of use and enjoyment of the land.
When the court was confronted with Ackerman v Port of
Seattle,'3 which involved frequent flights over the land of the plaintiff, it turned to the Smith definition of property. Later in Martin,
the court relied upon the owner's right to be free from interference
14
with the use and enjoyment of his land.
The United States Supreme Court has also recognized similar
intangible interests as property: The case of Richards v Washington
Terminal Co. 5 came very close to recognizing that enjoyable use of
land free from any nuisance is an intangible interest. There the
court held that the blast of smoke and dust from a railroad tunnel
amounted to the condemnation of an interest in enjoyment. This
interest, couched in terms of nuisance, allowed the landowner to be
free from "special and peculiar damage" of a kind not suffered
generally by those affected by the railroad. 6
Montana has hinted at a similar definition in Root v Butte,
Anaconda and Pacific Ry Co.." The defendant railroad constructed
its tracks near the home of the plaintiff, who complained that the
noise of passing trains had greatly damaged the value of his property. The court stated, "[I]f plaintiff's property has been lessened
in value by the running of trains,. . . on account of the construction
and operation of appellant railroad,. . .and such damage is in excess of that sustained by the community at large, he has sustained
special damages and a recovery may be had."'" The court's language
is important:
10.
11.
12.
(1901).
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty," 13 ComREu. L. Q. 8, 11 (1927).
United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court of King County, 26 Wash. 278, 66 P. 385
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash.2d 400, 348 P.2d 664 (1960).
Martin v. Port of Seattle, supra note 5.
Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914).
Id. at 557.
Root v. Butte, Anaconda, and Pacific Ry. Co., 20 Mont. 354, 51 P. 155 (1897).
Id. at 156.
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If the road is well constructed and skillfully operated. . . vibration, to any particular extent, would not naturally or necessarily follow;. . . nor would the ringing of bells or blowing of whistles
naturally and necessarily injure the owner's enjoyment of the property, or its value, to any greater extent than do the running of a
railroad and such incidents as are mentioned above, connected
with the running of trains, injure the general public, but which
could not be taken into consideration in estimating plaintiffs
damages.19 (emphasis supplied)
And if the damages are special, then the plaintiff can recover from
the governmental entity. By this language, the court seems to have
defined the owner's enjoyment of his land as property.
B. RiparianRights
The intangible interests that a landowner possesses appear in
other Washington property cases. In the Petition of Clinton Water
District of Island County, 0 the court recognized that the riparian
right of an owner of land adjacent to a lake is an interest capable of
being condemned. Riparian rights attached and appurtenant to
land are vested property rights and are entitled to the protection
under the Washington eminent domain provision.
At a much earlier date, the United States Supreme Court, in
United States v. Cress,"'held that the right of a riparian owner to
the stream flowing past his land is condemnable. There the government had constructed a dam, which backed up water into a tributary, on which the plaintiff's mill was located. Consequently, the
flowage in the river was reduced so that the mill wheel would not
turn. The Court held that the government's action was a taking of
the right of flowage.-*
Another area of riparian rights is the polluting of streams by a
governmental entity. In Snavely v City of Goldendale, 23 the Washington court, which did not clearly state the nature of the interest
involved, noted that while polluting a stream is generally held to be
tortious, it can result in a taking or damaging of property. It is
suggested that the court was referring generally to the intangible
riparian interest.
Later, in City of Walla Walla v Conkey,24 the court of appeals
19. Id. at 156.
20. Petition of Clinton Water District of Island County, 36 Wash.2d 284, 218 P.2d 309
(1950).
21. United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
22. U.S. v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945) limits the Cress case but did
not overrule it.
23. Snavely v. City of Goldendale, 10 Wash.2d 453, 117 P.2d 221 (1941).
24. City of Walla Walla v. Conkey, 6 Wash.App. 43, 492 P.2d 589 (1971).
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stated that "pollution of a stream by a municipality. . .constitutes
a constitutional taking, where the disposal results in pollution of the
stream on such a scale as to create a public nuisance." The court
relied upon the Snavely case. Other states have reached a similar
result.2 5
Montana has also recognized that an owner of land, appurtenant to a stream or ditch, has an interest capable of being condemned. In Mettler v Ames Realty Co., the court stated that under
the common law doctrine, "[T]he right to the use and flow of the
waters of a stream is an inherent right incident to the ownership of
riparian lands, a right annexed to the soil, not as an easement or
appurtenance, but as part and parcel of the land itself. . . ."" The
court's statement must be taken with the warning that Mettler
involved the doctrine of appropriation and not eminent domain.
A view of Montana cases concerning ditch rights provides that
a riparian right or ditch right is an intangible interest in the context
of the eminent domain provision. In Hughes v King,27 the court,
relying on REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, §67-601(11) (1947),2s stated
that a ditch right is an easement. Later in City of Missoula v Mix,
the court noted: "An easement is a property right protected by
the taking of private property
constitutional guaranties 'against
29
without just compensation.
Citing Hughes and Mix, the court in Colarchik v. Watkins
stated:
That a ditch right is an easement is well settled in Montana law,
and an easement is property in the sense that it can not be taken
for public use without just compensation being paid to the
owner .... 30
C. Easements
An easement is also considered as property that is condemnable. In 1971, the court in State v Kodama31 observed that the appropriation of a private easement, which is a property right, may only
occur under the exercise of eminent domain. The court found no
distinction between an easement of access from abutting property
25. Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Sheriff v.
Easley, 178 S.C. 504, 183 S.E. 311 (1936).
26. Mettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 Mont. 152, 201 P. 702, 703 (1921).
27. Hughes v. King, 142 Mont. 227, 383 P.2d 816, 817 (1963).
28. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, §67-601(11) (1947) defines the right of having water
flow without diminution or disturbance of any kind as an easement.
29. City of Missoula v. Mix, 123 Mont. 365, 214 P.2d 212, 215 (1950).
30. Colarchik v. Watkins, 144 Mont. 17, 393 P.2d 786, 789 (1964).
31. State v. Kodama, 4 Wash.App. 676, 483 P.2d 857 (1971).
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to a roadway, and a private easement which provides access via a
corridor from the owner's property." Washington has recognized
that the right of reasonable egress and ingress attaches to the land
3
and is a property right as complete as ownership of the land itself.1
Consequently, where there has been physical impairment of access
by reduction of the street grade in front of the owner's land, 34 or on
3
a trestle and elevated railway built in front of the owner's land, 1
then the abutting landowner is entitled to just compensation.
The United States Supreme Court case of United States v
Welch3 is the leading example that an easement can be taken by
condemnation. The plaintiff owned a parcel of land to which there
was an easement of passage across a servient tenement. The government flooded the servient tenement and the passageway, cutting off
the plaintiff's egress and ingress. Although there was no physical
touching of the plaintiff's land, the court allowed recovery for the
plaintiff.
In Montana, as noted in Mix, an easement is property that is
condemnable. In reaching this decision, the court cited United
3
States v Welch7.
Montana also recognizes that the landowner has the right of
egress and ingress, which is attached to his land and is property. It
has been stated that "[T]he right of access. . . is the right of
reasonable ingress and egress from the abutting highway. '38
An important Montana case, similarly related to the right of
egress and ingress, is Less v City of Butte.39 There the plaintiff built
a home and made improvements on it relying on the grade of the
street as it then existed. Later, the city excavated the street to a
depth of seven feet, which left the plaintiff with no access to his
home. The court held that the plaintiff was entitled to compensation because of the change of the grade. The court stated:
The owner of a city lot has a kind of property in the public street
for the purpose of giving to such land facilities of light, of air, and
of access to the street. These easements are property, protected by
the constitution from being taken or damaged without just compensation.4 0
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 859.
Walker v. State, 48 Wash.2d 587, 295 P.2d 328, 330 (1956).
Brown v. City of Seattle, 5 Wash. 35, 31 P. 313 (1892).
State ex rel. Smith v. Superior Court, supra note 12.
United States v. Welch, 217 U.S. 333 (1910).
City of Missoula v. Mix, supra note 29 at 215.
State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, 142 Mont. 256, 384 P.2d 770, 775 (1963).
Less v. City of Butte, 28 Mont. 27, 72 P. 140 (1903).
Id. at 141.
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D.

Summary

The Washington Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court have consistently recognized that property as used in
the eminent domain provision is not only the material things but is
also certain rights in and appurtenant to those things. An overview
of Montana's approach to the definition of property in the eminent
domain provision provides a pattern similar to that developed by
the Washington and the United States Supreme Courts. While
Montana has not had many cases or definitive rulings, the court has
recognized that certain intangible, non-physical rights inhering in
the landowner are property.
DEFINITION OF TAKING OR DAMAGING

A.

Elimination of the Physical Invasion Requirement

Until 1870, all state constitutions contained only the word "taking." In that year, Illinois added the word "damaging" to its constitution,4 and now this addition appears in the constitutions of 26
states. 2 Originally, courts required the physical invasion of land
before a "taking" occurred.43 This requirement has almost com-

pletely disappeared as an examination of the following cases will
show."
In the Washington riparian right cases, a physical invasion or
touching of land is no longer necessary. 5 The elimination of the
requirement is also seen in the stream pollution cases where the
polluting resulted in a serious impairment of the riparian rights of
the landowner." Also, where there has been destruction of an easement, no physical invasion is required.47
In Ackerman,4 8 where the plaintiff's land was directly under the
flightpath of jet aircraft, there was no physical invasion of the
owner's land. In this regard, Causby54 can be viewed as a straying
away from the old requirement of a physical invasion.
Under the Root decision, the Montana Supreme Court specifically stated that a physical invasion of an individual's land is not
necessary." Whether the noise, which involves no physical touching
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Stoebuck, supra note 9 at 223.
2 NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §6.1(3) at 6-19 (3rd ed. 1974).
Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. 418, 430 (1823).
Nichols agress. 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT DOMAIN §6.1(1) at 6-12 (3rd ed. 1974).
Petition of Clinton Water District of Island County, supra note 20.
Snavely v. City of Goldendale, supra note 23.
State v. Kodama, supra note 31.
Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, supra note 13.
United States v. Causby, supra note 3.
Root v. Butte, Anaconda, and Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 17 at 156.
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of land, emanates from directly above or from the side is not important, just as long as the resulting damages are special. Root did not
draw vertical lines from the owner's land as was done in Causby, but
recognized that noise from anywhere could amount to a damaging.
The elimination of this requirement can be seen in other Montana cases, discussed in conjunction with the meaning of the word
"property." The taking or damaging of ditch rights5 or easements"
or the deprivation of access 5 3 do not require the physical invasion or
actual touching of the owner's land.
B.

The Effect of the Word "Damage"

In some cases, where a non-physical property interest was involved, courts have stated in dictum that the addition of the word
"damage" would permit compensation. But the exact importance
of this additional word is still not clear. It would seem that a state
supreme court, which has the word "damage" in its constitution,
could more easily allow compensation for interference with the
rights that a landowner possesses, than a court with a provision
containing only the word "taking." But in Oregon, where the eminent domain provision does not contain the word "damage",5 5 the
court had no trouble in allowing compensation to the owner, who
was substantially deprived of the useful possession and enjoyment
of his land as the result of jet noise originating outside his bounda-

ries .5
The exact importance of the word "damage" is further muddled
by the Supreme Court of Washington, whose eminent domain provision contains both "taking" and "damaging." 57 In Martin, the court
refused to distinguish between "taking" and "damaging." 58
In Montana, the distinction is clearer. In Less, the court, noting
that no physical invasion is necessary, 5 used that statement to explain the effect of the word "damage." The court stated that under
the constitutions which provide "that property shall not be taken
or damaged, it is universally held that no physical invasion is
necessary.""0 (emphasis supplied)
51. Colarchik v. Watkins, supra note 30.
52. City of Missoula v. Mix, supra note 29.
53. State Highway Comm'n v. Keneally, supra note 38.
54. Randall v. City of Milwaukee, 212 Wis. 374, 249 N.W. 73 (1933); Seldon v. City of
Jacksonville, 28 Fla. 558, 10 So. 457 (1891).
55. ORE. CONST. art I, §18.
56. Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Ore. 178, 376 P.2d 100 (1962).
57. WASH. CONST. art. I, §16.
58. Martin v. Port of Seattle, supra note 5 at 545.
59. Root v. Butte, Anaconda, and Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 17 at 156.
60. Less v. City of Butte, supra note 39 at 141.
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CONCLUSION
With the recognition that the use and enjoyment of land is
property, and that this interest can be taken or damaged without
any physical invasion, then the Washington decision in Martin is
understandable and logical. An interference with this interest by
aircraft noise, which certainly involves no physical invasion, results
in the taking or damaging of property, for which there must be
compensation.
Montana has basically the same definitions of "property" and
"taking or damaging" as Washington. Consequently, a decision by
the supreme court of Montana allowing compensation to landowners for aircraft noise originating outside the boundaries of land
would be the logical result in view of the definitions the court has
given to these words in our eminent domain provision.
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